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Appellate Practice and Procedure
by William M. Droze*
and
Jeri N. Sute**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Rules of practice and procedure in appellate courts, such as the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, significantly impact
From
cases brought before those courts comprising the circuit.
enforcement of procedural rules requiring the timely filing of a notice of
appeal to application of justiciability doctrines to determine a party's
standing to bring a claim, issues of practice and procedure commonly
arise at the court of appeals.
This Article explores the application of practice and procedure by the
Eleventh Circuit during 1999. The topics discussed include appellate
culling of appealable issues; appellate treatment of interlocutory matters;
timeliness of notice of appeal and presentation of argument; doctrines of
standing, ripeness, justiciability, and mootness; and standards of review
on appeal. This Article also identifies common themes or trends when
apparent.
Technology has begun to intrude upon the application of practice rules
within the Eleventh Circuit. In a 1999 case, the court grappled with the
impact of emerging technology and its incorporation into appellate
procedure. In Hollins v. Department of Corrections,' appellant filed a
notice of appeal more than fourteen months after the district court's final
order had been entered, well past the deadline for filing an appeal. The
court faced the issue of whether the late filing was excused because of

* Partner in the law firm of Troutman Sanders L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. University
of North Carolina (A.B., 1984); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1987).
** Associate in the law firm of Troutman Sanders L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia. University
of Alabama (B.A., summa cum laude, 1996); Emory University School of Law (J.D., with
honors, 1999).
1. 191 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999).
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appellant's reliance on the Public Access to Court Electronic Records
("PACER") system's version of the docket sheet, which failed to show the
district court's entry of the final order.2 In finding that it was excused,
the court stated,
Providing electronic access to court calendars, dockets and other
essential information is a project of long standing in the federal courts.
Services such as the PACER system, while still somewhat experimental, continue to receive strong endorsements and have generated ever
increasing demand... both from within the legal community and from
other interested parties. By allowing parties and their counsel to
monitor the progress of their cases (and, in some jurisdictions, to file
pleadings and other material) without traveling to court and placing
demands upon the time of court personnel, systems such as PACER
ease costs for both parties and the courts. But that and other benefits
of such systems will arise only if parties actually can rely on electronically available court information. In this context, we conclude it was
not unreasonable for Hollins [sic] counsel to rely on the PACER
docket.3
This resolution appears to forecast the court's commitment to
incorporating technology into the appellate arena while giving litigants
some measure of assurance that reliance upon new technology will not
prove fatal in instances when that technology fails.
II.

APPELLATE CULLING OF APPEALABLE

ISSUES

Consideration of the many cases raising practice and procedure issues
before the Eleventh Circuit in 1999 reveals several common themes.
First, the court applied its rules of practice and procedure to dismiss
appeals and issues not appropriate for appellate consideration at the
time of their presentation to the court. The court did not, however,
apply those rules at the cost of ensuring justice in cases before it.
Additional support for this trend is seen in the court's continued
emphasis on goals of judicial economy and efficiency. Finally, the court
also provided thorough explanations for its decisions on issues of
appellate practice and procedure, most likely with the aim of providing
district courts with enough guidance to eliminate repeated appeals
involving the same or similar issues.
Application of appellate practice and procedure rules by the Eleventh
Circuit enabled the court to dispose of many cases and issues not

2. Id. at 1325.
3. Id. at 1327 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2000]

APPELLATE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

1045

appropriate for resolution by it. For example, in Woodard v. STP
Corp.,4 the court refused to review the district court's order denying
plaintiff's motion for remand on the basis that it did not have proper
jurisdiction.5 The court found that although the district court's
subsequent order granting plaintiff's motion for voluntary dismissal was
a final judgment, the manner in which that judgment was obtained-pursuant to plaintiff's request-militated against its treatment
as an appealable final judgment of the remand issue.6 Similarly, in
State Treasurer of Michigan v. Barry,7 the court held that it lacked
jurisdiction over the appeal.8 The district court's partial summary
judgment order left plaintiff's claims and defendant's counterclaim
pending.9 Furthermore, the parties were trying to create a final
judgment as to the summary judgment for purposes of appeal by
stipulating to dismissal, without prejudice, of the remaining claims. °
Finally, in Druhan v. American Mutual Life," the court again declined
to exercise jurisdiction over the appeal of an interlocutory order denying
plaintiff's motion to remand and the subsequent final judgment granting
plaintiff's request for voluntary dismissal with prejudice. 2 Plaintiff
requested the dismissal with prejudice only as a means of establishing
finality in the case such that she could immediately appeal the
interlocutory order.13 Thus, the court refused to consider the case
because the district court's order denying remand was not among the
orders from which an interlocutory appeal lies as a matter of right under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and because plaintiff did not seek an appeal by
certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).' 4
In Dzikowski v. Boomer's Sports & Recreation Center,Inc. (In re Boca
Arena, Inc.),5 the court refused to allow appellate review under Rule
54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because there was no Rule
54(b) certification. 6 The court rejected appellant's argument that
certification was not required because of the applicability of the

4.
5.

170 F.3d 1043 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1044.

6. Id.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

168 F.3d 8 (11th Cir. 1999).

Id. at 16.
Id. at 11.
Id.
166 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1325-26.
Id. at 1326.
Id.
184 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1286.
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Bankruptcy Code. 7 First, the court recognized that bankruptcy rules
expressly provide that Rule 54(a)-(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure applies in adversarial proceedings in bankruptcy. 8 Accordingly, the court reasoned, "a bankruptcy order that disposes of fewer
than all claims or parties in an adversary proceeding is not immediately
appealable unless the bankruptcy judge certifies the order for immediate
review pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7054, which incorporates Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(b)." 9 Next, the court rejected the bankruptcy trustee's
argument that flexible concepts of finality in bankruptcy proceedings
override the clear mandate of Rule 54(b) and allow such an appeal to
proceed absent Rule 54(b) certification. 20 Preferring the bright-line rule
established by Rule 54(b), the court dismissed the trustee's appeal
because there was no Rule 54(b) certification.2 '
All these cases
demonstrate the court's desire to promote judicial efficiency and avoid
piecemeal appeals by looking behind the facade created by the parties
in their attempts to prematurely appeal their cases to the Eleventh
Circuit.2 2
The court similarly scrutinized litigants attempting to appeal under
the collateral order doctrine.23
In Summit Medical Associates v.
Pryor,2 4 the court analyzed whether it could exercise appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the collateral order doctrine.
In finding that it did
not have jurisdiction to review a denial of a motion to dismiss for want
of standing, the court relied on the fact that appellant had failed to
demonstrate the applicability of all three requirements for application
of the collateral order doctrine. 6 In Citizens Concerned About Our
Children v. School Board of Broward County, Florida, the court was
presented with the mirror image of the Summit issue-whether the
grant of a dismissal for want of standing was reviewable.2 8 As in
Summit, the court in Citizens Concerned About Our Children found the
order unreviewable under the collateral order doctrine.2" In both cases

17.

Id.

18. Id.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id.
Id. at 1287.
Id.
See State Treasurerof Mich., 168 F.3d at 16.
See discussion infra Part III.
180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1334.
Id. at 1334-35.
193 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
Id. at 1288.
Id. at 1290.
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the orders were reviewable on appeal from a final judgment; thus, they
were not reviewable interlocutorily because the third requirement for
application of the collateral order doctrine was not satisfied.3 0
In 1999 the court also applied procedural rules regarding the timely
filing of notices of appeal to dispose of cases not properly appealed. In
Roberts v. Commissioner,3 the court refused to excuse an untimely
notice of appeal and rejected the argument that the Bankruptcy Code
extended the parties' time to appeal.32 As indicated above, however,
the court did not sacrifice justice while applying practice and procedure
rules.
When justice so required, the court departed from strict
adherence to those rules. For example, in Hollins v. Department of
33
the court excused a party's untimely appeal because the
Corrections,
lateness of the appeal resulted from a mistake in the district court
computer docketing system.3 4 Similarly, in Summit the court departed
from its usual refusal to hear arguments raised for the first time on
appeal to "'avoid a miscarriage of justice.'" 5 By departing from its
general practices in both Hollins and Summit, the court demonstrated
that it would not blindly apply its rules of practice and procedure, but
would instead apply them with the goals of ensuring fairness and
adjudicating the merits of disputes when possible.
When necessary, the court also gave district courts significant
guidance on issues remanded to those courts. In McKinley v. Kaplan,36
the court provided the district court with a discussion of the proper
disposition of a motion to amend under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, after deciding that the district court abused its
discretion by not allowing plaintiff to amend her complaint.37 Such
thorough analysis in this case, as well as in others, helps guide district
courts in the disposition of similar issues, thereby decreasing the
likelihood that the Eleventh Circuit will see repeated appeals of the
same issue. This, in turn, promotes judicial efficiency and economy-a
trend continuing from the 1990s.

30. Id.; Summit, 180 F.3d at 1334-35.
31. 175 F.3d 889 (11th Cir. 1999).
32. Id. at 893.
33. 191 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999).
34. Id. at 1325-26. For further discussion of Hollins, see infra notes 80-84 and
accompanying text.
35. 180 F.3d at 1341 n.12 (quoting Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. LaQuinta
Motor Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 989 (11th Cir. 1982)).
36. 177 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 1999).
37. Id. at 1258.
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III. APPELLATE TREATMENT OF INTERLOCUTORY MATTERS
Appellate courts have jurisdiction to review cases after final judgment
from courts below."8 In addition, there are circumstances in which
appellate courts have jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals, which
are appeals taken before final judgment. Appellants who seek interlocutory review must demonstrate the existence of an appropriate basis for

38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). This section provides,
The courts of appeals (other than the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States, the United States District Court for the
District of the Canal Zone, the District Court of Guam, and the District Court of
the Virgin Islands, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
Court. The jurisdiction of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit shall be limited to the jurisdiction described in sections 1292(c) and (d) and
1295 of this title.
Id.; see also Bishop v. Avera, 177 F.3d 1233, 1234 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999) (exercising
jurisdiction to review a denial of summary judgment on a qualified immunity claim);
Campbell v. Sikes, 169 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999) (reviewing final judgment of
magistrate judge granting summary judgment for defendants). But see Woodard v. STP
Corp., 170 F.3d 1043, 1044 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction to
review the district court order granting with prejudice plaintiffs motion for voluntary
dismissal because, even though the order was a final judgment, it was obtained at the
request of the plaintiff and therefore involved no case or controversy); State Treasurer of
Mich. v. Barry, 168 F.3d 8, 13 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that the court lacked jurisdiction
for appeal because the district court's partial summary judgment order left plaintiffs
claims and defendant's counterclaim pending and, hence, was not a final decision, and the
parties could not create appellate jurisdiction by obtaining dismissal of the remaining
claims without prejudice); Druhan v. American Mut. Life, 166 F.3d 1324, 1325-26 (11th Cir.
1999) (holding that the court does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an
interlocutory order denying plaintiffs motion to remand and the subsequent final judgment
granting plaintiffs request for voluntary dismissal with prejudice because plaintiff
requested the dismissal with prejudice only as a means of establishing finality in the case
such that she could immediately appeal the interlocutory order, because the district court's
order denying remand was not among the orders from which an appeal lies as a matter of
right under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), and because plaintiff did not seek an appeal by
certification pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)). The "final judgment" rule serves several
salutary purposes, such as preventing piecemeal appeals that might otherwise undermine
the independence of the district judge, avoiding obstruction to just claims, and promoting
efficient judicial administration. Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198,
203-04 (1999). When Congress sets forth special rules governing appeals, such as those
rules set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act that govern appeals from a district court's
arbitration order, the court may look to those rules to determine whether a decision is
appealable, instead of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149,
1152 (11th Cir. 1999).
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immediate appeal; failure to do so may prove as fatal as neglecting to
file a notice of appeal or filing this notice in an untimely fashion.39
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), the Eleventh Circuit generally has
jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals regarding a lower court's grant,
continuation, modification, refusal, dissolution, or refusal to dissolve or
modify an injunction. 40 The court has held that under Section 1292(a)(1), an order that does not rule on a request for injunctive relief, but that
has the effect of denying it, may also be immediately appealable if the
appellant demonstrates that the denial of injunctive relief would have
a "'serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence, and that the order can be
effectually challenged only by immediate appeal.'"4 1
In Citizens
Concerned About Our Children v. School Board of Broward County,
42
Florida,
the court rejected the argument of Citizens Concerned About
Our Children ("CC")that interlocutory review was permissible under
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).4 3 The court recognized that CCC's complaint
requested injunctive relief, but also found that in almost "two years
between the filing of the complaint and the district court's dismissal of
CCC's claims for want of standing, CCC did not move for preliminary
injunctive relief."4 Even though the court acknowledged that a request
for preliminary or permanent relief will not necessarily be dispositive,
it found that CCC's failure to seek immediate relief suggested that delay
of the appeal until final judgment would not inflict irreparable harm.4
In 1999 the court also examined interlocutory appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3), which grants courts of appeals jurisdiction
over interlocutory decrees determining the rights and liabilities of
parties to admiralty cases.4 6 In Sea Lane Bahamas, Ltd. v. Europa

39. See generally Pinion v. Dow Chem., U.S.A., 928 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1991).
40. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1994). See, e.g., Sierra Club v. Georgia Power Co., 180
F.3d 1309, 1310 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (reviewing the district court's denial of
appellant's motion for preliminary injunction); Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 880-81 (11th
Cir. 1999) (reviewing the district court's order permanently enjoining enforcement of a
Florida statute); Allen v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 164 F.3d 1347, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999)
(finding that the court had jurisdiction over an appeal of the district court's refusal,
without prejudice, to vacate a consent decree containing injunctive relief).
41. Citizens Concerned About Our Children v. School Bd. of Broward County, Fla., 193
F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (quoting Stringfellow v. Concerned Neighbors
in Action, 480 U.S. 370, 379 (1987)).
42. 193 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
43. Id. at 1289.
44. Id. at 1290.
45. Id.
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(3) (1994). This section provides that "the courts of appeals
shall have jurisdiction of appeals from interlocutory decrees of such district courts or the
judges thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to admiralty cases in
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Cruises Corp., the court found that it did not have jurisdiction under
Section 1292(a)(3) and accordingly dismissed the appeal of the district
court's denial of appellant's motion to reopen the case and amend the
complaint to add a party.48 The court found that the appeal involved
an issue of admiralty law, but determined that the presence of an
admiralty issue alone did not fulfill the requirements of Section
1292(a)(3).4 ' Because the district court's denial of appellant's motions
did not determine the "rights and liabilities of the parties," as required
by Section 1292(a)(3), the court declined to exercise appellate jurisdiction.5 ° The court based this decision, at least in part, on its determination that Section 1292(a)(3) should be construed narrowly.5'
Additional bases of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction exist pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) and Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), a district court judge can certify an
order for interlocutory review when (1) the order concerns "a controlling
question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion," and (2) "immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation."5 2 When these two
requirements are met, the court of appeals may, in its discretion, permit
the appeal if application is made within ten days after entry of the
district court's order.53 The court permitted appeal pursuant to Section
1292(b) several times in 1999. 54

For example, in Bryant v. Avado

Brands, Inc., the court permitted appeal following the district court's
certification of an order denying defendants' motion to dismiss so the
court could answer "novel questions" under the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995. 56

Similarly, in Davis v. Carl Cannon

Chevrolet-Olds, Inc.," following the district court's certification of an
order denying plaintiffs' motion to remand, the court permitted appeal

which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Id.

47. 188 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1999).
48. Id. at 1326.

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1322.
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1994).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., BLAB T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Communications, Inc., 182
F.3d 851 (11th Cir. 1999) (exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to address
whether Section 612 of the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984 completely preempts

state law tort and breach of contract claims involving "leased access" cable channels such
that claims are removable to federal court).

55. 187 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 1999).
56. Id. at 1273.
57. 182 F.3d 792 (11th Cir. 1999).
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to address issues of diversity jurisdiction.58 However, if a party does
not seek or receive a certification order from the district court, the
appellate court cannot permit appeal unless there is an alternative basis
for appeal, such as appeal from a final judgment.59
Under Rule 54 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,. when multiple
claims for relief are presented in one action, the court may direct entry
of final judgment as to fewer than all the claims or parties if there is an
express determination by the court that "there is no just reason for
delay."60 Even when a court enters judgment with regard to one of the
parties in a case involving multiple parties and enters that judgment
based on Rule 54(b), the court of appeals may construe the district
court's order as constituting a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b). 1
In Harris v. United States,62 the court construed the district court's
order as a final judgment under Rule 54(b) even though the district
court entered final judgment in favor of only one of the parties under
Rule 58 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 3 The court cited two
justifications for doing this: (1) the appellant moved the district court to
certify its judgment "in favor of [the one party] under Rule 54(b), and the
district court stated in its order that it was granting that motion"; and
(2) because the district court had not rendered a final judgment with
respect to the other party, it could not have entered judgment in favor
of the one unless it did so under Rule 54(b).r
An order that is not final as contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 1291 does
not fall within the classes of orders for which interlocutory review is
authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) and that has not been certified for
appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) or Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure may nevertheless be reviewable under the collateral
order doctrine established by the United States Supreme Court in Cohen
v. Beneficial Life Industrial Loan Corp.65 Under the collateral order
doctrine, also called the Cohen doctrine, an appellate court may review

58. Id. at 794.
59. Woodard v. STP Corp., 170 F.3d 1043, 1044 (11th Cir. 1999) (stating plaintiff could
not appeal directly from the lower court's order denying remand because plaintiff did not
obtain district court certification).
60. FED. R. CIv. P. 54(b). See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342, 1346
(1 1th Cir. 1999); Crum v. Alabama (In re Employment Discrimination Litig. Against Ala.),
198 F.3d 1305, 1309-10 (11th Cir. 1999); Boyd v. Homes of Legend, Inc., 188 F.3d 1294,
1297 (11th Cir. 1999).
61. Harris v. United States, 175 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1999).
62. 175 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 1999).
63. Id. at 1320.
64. Id.
65. 337 U.S. 541, 545-47 (1949).
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a nonfinal judgment if the order (1) conclusively determines the disputed
question, (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the
merits of the action, and (3) may be effectively unreviewable on appeal
from a final judgment.6 In Summit Medical Associates v. Pryor,67 the
Eleventh Circuit applied the Cohen doctrine to consider whether the
district court erred in concluding that appellants were not entitled to
sovereign immunity.68 Likewise, in Tamiami Partners,Ltd. v. Miccosu69
kee Tribe of Indians of Florida,
the court exercised its appellate
jurisdiction pursuant to the Cohen doctrine to review the district court's
denial of sovereign immunity to defendants.7 °
There are limits,
however, on the court's exercise of appellate jurisdiction pursuant to the
Cohen doctrine. For example, in Summit Medical Associates and
Citizens Concerned About Our Children, the court declined to review,
pursuant to the Cohen doctrine, the district courts' orders regarding
standing because, in both cases, those orders would be reviewable on
appeal from final judgment, and, thus, they failed to satisfy the third
prong of the Cohen test.71
The court's treatment of interlocutory matters during 1999 demonstrates its strict enforcement of the prerequisites for interlocutory
appeal. The rationale for strict adherence to the final judgment rule and
narrow application of statutes and rules permitting interlocutory appeals
is likely judicial efficiency, that is, the court's interest in expediting
litigation, assuring district court supervision of dockets, and limiting the
number of appeals and issues before the court of appeals. Those
interests have affected other aspects of appellate practice and procedure
as well.
IV.

TIMELINESS OF NOTICE OF APPEAL AND PRESENTATION OF
ARGUMENT

When an interlocutory appeal is properly pursued, that appeal must
still comply with procedural rules requiring the timely filing of a notice

66. Id. at 546.
67. 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999).
68. Id. at 1334.
69. 177 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 1999).
70. Id. at 1221; see also Jones v. Cannon, 174 F.3d 1271, 1280 (11th Cir. 1999)
(exercising jurisdiction under the Cohen doctrine to review defendants' claims of absolute
and qualified immunity under federal law in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983);
Mastroianni v. Bowers, 173 F.3d 1363, 1366 (11th Cir. 1999) (review of denial of summary
judgment based on absolute and qualified immunity); Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d 683,685
(11th Cir. 1999) (review of denial of qualified immunity).
71. Citizens Concerned About Our Children, 193 F.3d at 1290; Summit, 180 F.3d at
1334-35; see also supra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.

20001

APPELLATE PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

1053

of appeal. Under Rule 4(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, notice of appeal in a civil case must be filed with the district
court clerk within thirty days after entry of the judgment or order
appealed from. 72 "[Tihe timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory
and jurisdictional."73 Thus, if a party fails to file a timely notice of
appeal, the court lacks jurisdiction to decide the issues presented.74
Rule 4(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the "unique
circumstances" doctrine offer limited alternatives for the exercise of
jurisdiction by the appellate court, despite a party's untimely appeal.
Under Rule 4(a)(5) "[t]he district court may extend the time to file a
notice of appeal if (i) a party so moves no later than 30 days after" the
judgment or order appealed from is entered, and "(ii) that party shows
excusable neglect or good cause."75 In considering whether there has
been excusable neglect, a court may consider "'the danger of prejudice
to the other party, the length of the delay and its potential impact on
judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including whether it was
within the reasonable control of the movant, and whether the movant
acted in good faith.'" 71 Under the unique circumstances doctrine, either
the district court or the appellate court may permit an appeal, though
untimely, in situations "where a party has performed an act which, if
properly done, would postpone the deadline for filing his appeal and has
received specific77 assurance by a judicial officer that this act has been
properly done."
During 1999 the court examined issues relating to notices of appeal in
several contexts. In Wilson v. Navistar International Transportation

72. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A). Note, however, that under Rule 4(a)(1)(B) of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure, '[w]hen the United States or its officer or agency is a party,
the notice of appeal may be filed by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order
appealed from is entered." FED. R. APp. P. 4(a)(1)(B).
73. Hollins v. Department of Corrections, 191 F.3d 1324, 1326 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
74. Id.
75. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5).
76. Walter v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 181 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir.

1999) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993))
(applying excusable neglect analysis to determine that the district court abused its
discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to set aside the order of dismissal because plaintiffs
counsel engaged in excusable neglect).
77. Holins, 191 F.3d at 1327 (citing Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 179
(1989)). In Pinion v. Dow Chemical, U.S.A., 928 F.2d 1522 (11th Cir. 1991), the Eleventh
Circuit adopted a lenient formulation of this doctrine by providing that any judicial action

prior to the expiration of the relevant time period for appeal that could have lulled the
appellant into inactivity may permit application of the doctrine. Id. at 1529.
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Corp.,78 the court examined the effect of a premature notice of appeal
and concluded that a notice of appeal that "is filed between the time of
a decision or order and the time that the order is rendered appealable
is
by the entry of judgment the otherwise premature notice of7appeal
9
treated as if filed on the date of and after entry of judgment."
In Hollins v. Department of Corrections, ° the court examined the
applicability of an exception to the requirement of a timely notice of
appeal. The appeal at issue was filed more than fourteen months after
the district court's final order was entered. Appellant contended the
court should hear his appeal despite his untimely notice because the
district court's order never reached appellant or his counsel and because
entry of the order was not reflected on the version of the docket
appearing on the court's electronic system that allows litigants remote
computer access to court records."1 In response to these arguments, the
court first acknowledged a limited exception to the requirement of a
timely notice of appeal, known as the unique circumstances doctrine,
under which an appellant may maintain an untimely appeal if
"the appellant reasonably and in good faith relied upon judicial action
that indicated to the appellant that his assertion of his right to appeal
would be timely, so long as the judicial action occurred prior to the
expiration of the official time period such that the appellant" 82could have
given timely notice had he not been lulled into inactivity.
Furthermore, the court noted that it utilizes a "lenient formulation of the
unique circumstances exception."83 In light of this, the court found
appellant's reliance on the computer docket system constituted
reasonable reliance on judicial action that justified the court's exercise
of equitable power to excuse the untimely filing of the appeal.84
In Roberts v. Commissioner,5 the court examined the requirement of
a timely notice of appeal in the bankruptcy context. Appellants filed a
notice of appeal from a decision of the Tax Court more than ninety days
after entry of the Tax Court order.8" Appellants argued that the

78. 193 F.3d 1212 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
79. Id. at 1213. This is consistent with Rule 4(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
80. 191 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999).
81. Id. at 1325.
82. Id. at 1327 (quoting Willis v. Newsome, 747 F.2d 605, 606 (11th Cir. 1984)).
83. Id. (citing Pinion, 928 F.2d at 1531).

84. Id. at 1329.
85. 175 F.3d 889 (11th Cir. 1999).
86. Id. at 893. To obtain appellate review of a decision of the Tax Court, a party to

that decision must file "anotice of appeal with the clerk of the Tax Court within 90 days
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ninety-day period for filing a notice of appeal was stayed or sufficiently
extended by virtue of several provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, which
was applicable because of appellants' bankruptcy filing before the Tax
Court's entry of judgment.87 Rejecting appellants' arguments, the court
found that Sections 362(a)(1), 362(a)(8), and 108 of the Bankruptcy Code
neither stayed nor sufficiently extended the ninety-day period, and
appellants' notice of appeal was therefore untimely.8
In Weaver v. Florida Power & Light Co.," the court discussed the
effect of a notice of appeal on the district court's jurisdiction. 90 The
court first noted the well-settled rule that "the filing of a notice of appeal
divests the district court of jurisdiction over a case."9 The court also
observed that the general rule regarding divestiture of jurisdiction "does
not apply to collateral matters not affecting the questions presented on
appeal."9 2 Because the direct appeal in Weaver involved the merits of
appellant's claims of sex and handicap discrimination and was completely unrelated to the district court's postnotice entry of an injunction
against appellant's pursuit of arbitration, the 9court
held that the district
3
court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction.
Just as the court generally cannot hear an untimely appeal, the court
likewise usually declines to address issues not previously considered by
the district court.94 Because this is a rule of practice and not a
jurisdictional limitation,95 the court may exercise its discretion to
depart from its usual practice in limited circumstances. For example, in

after the decision of the Tax Court is entered." 26 U.S.C. § 7483 (1994).
87. 175 F.3d at 893.
88. Id.
89. 172 F.3d 771 (11th Cir. 1999).
90. Id. at 773.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. Although the district court had jurisdiction to hear arguments for the
injunction, the court found that the district court abused its discretion by enjoining the
arbitration proceedings. Id.
94. See, e.g., Inglesby, Falligant, Horne, Courington & Nash, P.C. v. Moore (In re
American Steel Prod., Inc.), 197 F.3d 1354, 1357 (Q1thCir. 1999) (declining to address the
merits of whether debtor's attorney was entitled to compensation for professional services
rendered to debtor prior to the appointment of the 'Chapter 11 trustee because the issue
was not considered by the district court and the case did not present compelling
circumstances warranting consideration of the issue even in the absence of the district
court's consideration of the issue); Davis v. Carl Cannon Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 182 F.3d 792,
798 (11th Cir. 1999) (declining to consider alternative grounds supporting diversity
jurisdiction because the district court, in deciding that diversity jurisdiction applied on one
basis, did not consider alternative grounds for the exercise of diversity jurisdiction).
95. Ochran v. United States, 117 F.3d 495, 502 (11th Cir. 1997). The purposes of this
rule of practice include avoidance of prejudice to parties and judicial economy. Id. at 503.
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Summit Medical Associates v. Pryor," the court permitted presentation
of arguments raised 'for the first time on appeal because the issue was
a "'pure question of law'" and because refusal to consider the issue
"'would result in a miscarriage of justice.' 97
V.

DOCTRINES OF STANDING, RIPENESS, JUSTICIABILITY, AND
MOOTNESS

Article III of the federal Constitution confines federal courts to
This case-oradjudicating only actual cases and controversies.9"
controversy requirement limits the power of federal courts to decide only
99
those disputes that should be resolved through the judicial process,
thereby permitting effective decisionmaking by the court. °°
One of the most important of these constitutionally based limits is the
requirement that a litigant have standing to invoke the power of a
federal court. 01' Standing is a threshold test that, if satisfied, permits
the court to proceed to other issues raised in a case.'0 2 To establish
standing, a plaintiff must have an injury in fact, there must be a causal
connection between the injury and the challenged action that is not too
attenuated, and the court must be able to redress the injury by a
favorable decision. 03
The court in 1999 addressed the issue of a party's standing on
numerous occasions. In Lady J. Lingerie, Inc. v. City of Jacksonville, 104 appellants, adult entertainment establishments, challenged the
constitutionality of city ordinances subjecting adult businesses "to
various licensing, health and safety, and zoning regulations." 0 5
Finding that none of appellants was injured because none had applied
for a license for an affected site and because there was no evidence of
96. 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999).
97. Id. at 1341 n.12 (quoting Roofing & Sheet Metal Servs., Inc. v. LaQuinta Motor
Inns, Inc., 689 F.2d 982, 989 (11th Cir. 1982)). The court permitted consideration of the
issue of whether "[aippellees may challenge the private civil enforcement provision of the
partial-birth abortion statute under the doctrine of Ex ParteYoung, [209 U.S. 123 (1908)]."

Id.
98. See Malowney v. Federal Collection Deposit Group, 193 F.3d 1342, 1346 (11th Cir.
1999).
99. Georgia State Conference of NAACP Branches v. Cox, 183 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th
Cir. 1999).
100. Georgia Advocacy Office, Inc. v. Camp, 172 F.3d 1294, 1299 (11th Cir. 1999).

101. Malowney, 193 F.3d at 1346.
102. Florida Ass'n of Med. Equip. Dealers v. Apfel, 194 F.3d 1227, 1230 (11th Cir.
1999).
103. Georgia State Conference of NAACP Branches, 183 F.3d at 1262.
104.

176 F.3d 1358 (11th Cir. 1999).

105. Id. at 1360.
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any affected sites where the ordinance applied, the court rejected
plaintiff's claim challenging a provision that made an applicant ineligible
for an adult entertainment license if the sheriff had recently revoked a
license for the same premises."° In contrast, with regard to a provision requiring corporate applicants for adult business licenses to disclose
the names of principal stockholders, the court found that at least one
it was a corporaappellant had standing to challenge this rule because
1 7
tion and was therefore subject to the provision. 1
The court also had occasion to consider standing issues in more novel
situations. For example, in Vencor Hospitals v. Blue Cross Blue Shield
of Rhode Island,0l s the court found that a hospital had standing to sue
two patients' insurance provider when that provider failed to fully pay
the patients' medical expenses as provided in those patients' insurance
contracts.' °9 The hospital had standing on the basis that it was a
third-party beneficiary of the contracts, even though it was not a party
to the contracts." 0
Agripost, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County"' presented the court with the
issue of whether the prevailing party in the district court may appeal
the district court's decision. Ordinarily the prevailing party does not
have standing to appeal because it is assumed that the favorable
judgment has caused that party no injury.'12 An exception applies,
however, "when the prevailing party is prejudiced by the collateral
estoppel effect of the district court's order."" 3 In Agripost the court
found this exception applicable to defendant Dade County because, even
though the district court dismissed plaintiff's claim, the district court
had first rejected the county's res judicata and collateral estoppel
defenses." 4 Because the district court's action would preclude the
county from raising those same defenses in a state court proceeding, the
county had sufficient standing to appeal the case." 5
The court faced the issue of association or organization standing on
more than one occasion in 1999. To have standing to sue on behalf of its
members, an association or organization must show that "(1) the
members otherwise have standing to sue in their own right, (2) the

106.
107.
108.
109.

Id. at 1366.
Id.
169 F.3d 677 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 680.

110. Id.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

195 F.3d 1225 (11th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1225.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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interests the association seeks to protect are germane to its purpose, and
(3) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested require the
participation of individual members."" 6 An organization or association
does not have to demonstrate injury to itself or show that a statute
explicitly permits association or organization standing." ' In American
Iron & Steel Institute v. Occupational Safety & Health Administration,"8 the court found that the American College of Occupational and
Environmental Medicine had standing to challenge a new standard for
Contrarily, in Doe v.
respiratory protection in the workplace." 9
Stincer,2 ° the court found that the organization at issue, the Advocacy
Center for Persons with Disabilities, did not have standing on the record
before the court because it could not show that even one of its constituents had standing to sue.' 2 '
Another case-and-controversy requirement under Article III of the
federal Constitution that occasionally arose in 1999 cases of the Eleventh
Circuit was ripeness. To resolve an issue of ripeness, the court must
determine "'whether there is sufficient injury to meet Article III's
requirement of a case or controversy and, if so, whether the claim is
sufficiently mature, and the issues sufficiently defined and concrete, to
The ripeness
permit effective decisionmaking by the court.'"'22
doctrine prevents the court from dealing with abstractions that require
In Southeast Florida Cable, Inc. v. Martin
sheer speculation.'2 3
County, Florida,'24 the court found that plaintiff's Federal Cable Act
claim alleged a fully ripe dispute as to whether the county had a duty
to hold a public hearing at the party's request.'25 In contrast, in
Georgia Advocacy Office, Inc. v. Camp,'26 the court found that plaintiff's general access claim pursuant to the Protection and Advocacy for
Individuals with Mental Illness Act was not ripe for judicial review
because plaintiff neither demonstrated sufficient injury nor a sufficiently
mature claim.'27

116. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1274 n.10 (11th Cir. 1999).
117. Doe v. Stincer, 175 F.3d 879, 882 (11th Cir. 1999).
118. 182 F.3d 1261 (lth Cir. 1999).
119. Id. at 1274 n.10.
120. 175 F.3d 879 (11th Cir. 1999).
121. Id. at 886-87.
122. Southeast Fla. Cable, Inc. v. Martin County, Fla., 173 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir.
1999) (quoting Cheffer v. Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1524 (11th Cir. 1995)).
123. Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999).
124. 173 F.3d 1332 (11th Cir. 1999).
125. Id. at 1338.
126. 172 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 1999).
127. Id. at 1298-99.
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Closely related to the issue of ripeness is another issue ofjusticiabili-

ty-mootness. The court must refuse to hear an appeal if the issue is
moot. 2 ' "A federal court has no authority to give opinions on moot
questions or abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of law
which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it."129 A case

is moot if the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome
and intervening events have made it impossible to grant any effectual
relief to the prevailing party. 3 ° In many instances the court's resolution of one issue on appeal renders moot another issue within the same
case. For example, in Laker Airways, Inc. v . British Airways, PLC,'3'
the court's determination that the district court correctly dismissed the
case because of the absence of an indispensable party rendered moot one
party's motion for relief from judgment. 3 2 However, when intervening
events occur during the pendency of litigation that make the originallysought relief impossible, and when there are alternative forms of relief
still available, the court must carefully analyze whether to permit the
plaintiff to amend the complaint pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.'
VI.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

Pursuant to the Eleventh Circuit Rules, a brief submitted to the court
should contain a statement of the standard of review for each contention." In most cases the court, in its published opinion, indicates the
standard of review it is applying to each issue appealed. These
standards are furnished here to assist practitioners with briefing related
issues before the court. In 1999 the court detailed the applicable
standards of review in the following contexts: review of a district court's

128. Aquamar S.A. v. Del Monte Fresh Produce N.A., 179 F.3d 1279, 1287 (11th Cir.
1999).
129. Id. (citing John Roe, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1416, 1421 (11th Cir. 1998)).
130. Id.
131. 182 F.3d 843 (11th Cir. 1999).
132. Id. at 850-51; see also United States v. Georgia, Meriwether County, 171 F.3d
1344, 1346 n.2 (11th Cir. 1999) (denying plaintiffs' motion for summary reversal of the
district court's order ruling that continued federal court supervision of Troup County School
District was inappropriate because the motion was moot in light of the court's reversal of
the district court's order); Rose v. MIV GULF STREAM FALCON, 186 F.3d 1345, 1351
(11th Cir. 1999) (finding a challenge to the district court's award mooted by the fact that
the case had been remanded for another reason-recalculation of the lien amount); Sutton
v. Lader, 185 F.3d 1203, 1211 n.9 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding the issue of attorney fees moot
because of the court's resolution of the liability question).
133. McKinley v. Kaplan, 177 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 1999); see also supra notes 3637 and accompanying text.
134. 11TH CIR. R. 28-2(h)(iii).
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refusal to allow a plaintiff to amend its complaint based on the fact that
the amendment as proposed would be futile;135 review of a district
court's decision to disallow a jury demand and appoint a Rule 71A
136
commission to decide just compensation in eminent domain cases;
review of factual findings in bankruptcy proceedings;'37 review of
conclusions of law in bankruptcy proceedings;"" review of a grant of
summary judgment; 39 review of a district court's determination of
whether vote dilution has occurred; 4 ° review of a decision to grant a
preliminary injunction order;' 4 1 review of questions of law supporting
the grant of a preliminary injunction order; review of findings of fact
supporting the grant of a preliminary injunction order;4 3 review of a
district court's denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law;'"
review of a dismissal for failure to state a claim; 145 review of the
application of res judicata as a basis for barring a claim; 1 review of
the findings as to each factor in the analysis of whether there is a

135. St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d 815,822 (11th
Cir. 1999) (de novo).
136. Southern Natural Gas Co. v. Land, 197 F.3d 1368, 1372 (11th Cir. 1999) (abuse
of discretion).
137. Inglesby, Falligant, Home, Courington & Nash, P.C. v. Moore (In re American
Steel Prods., Inc.), 197 F.3d 1354, 1355 (11th Cir. 1999) (clear error); Kellogg v. Schreiber
(In re Kellogg), 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999) (clear error).
138. Inglesby, Falligant, Home, Courington & Nash, 197 F.3d at 1355 (de novo);
Morgan v. United States (In re Morgan), 182 F.3d 775, 777 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo).
139. Katz v. Comprehensive Plan of Group Ins., 197 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 1999)
(de novo); Kirby v. Siegelman, 195 F.3d 1285, 1289 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo); Watkins v.
Ford Motor Co., 190 F.3d 1213, 1216 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo); Carnival Brand Seafood
Co. v. Carnival Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1307, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo); Mitchell v.
USBI Co., 186 F.3d 1352, 1354 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo); Crawford v. Babbitt, 186 F.3d
1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo); Allison v. McGhan Med. Corp., 184 F.3d 1300, 1306
(11th Cir. 1999) (de novo); American Mfg. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tison Hog Mkt., Inc., 182 F.3d
1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo); Kay v. Apfel, 176 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 1999)
(de novo).
140. Johnson v. Hamrick, 196 F.3d 1216, 1219 (11th Cir. 1999) (clear error).
141. SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1198 (11th Cir. 1999) (abuse
of discretion).
142. Id. (de novo).
143. Id. (clear error).
144. Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1244 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo); Stimpson
v. City of Tuscaloosa, 186 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo); Clover v. Total Sys.
Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo).
145. United States v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 195 F.3d 1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 1999) (de
novo); Dunn v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, 193 F.3d 1185, 1190 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo); Long
v. Satz, 181 F.3d 1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo).
146. Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo).
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likelihood of confusion between trademarks; 47 review of the ultimate
conclusion regarding whether there is a likelihood of confusion between
trademarks;" review of an award of attorney fees; 49 review of a
determination of a statute's constitutionality; 50 review of a dismissal
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;'
review of a federal agency's factual determinations underlying its
regulations; 15 2 review of issues of subject matter jurisdiction; ' s review of the Board of Immigration Appeals denial of a motion to reopen
deportation proceedings; " review of the district court's order compel56
ling arbitration; 5 5 review of the NLRB's factual determinations;
review of the issue of a government official's qualified immunity from
suit; 57 review of the district court's denial of a motion to set aside a
final judgment;5 8 review of the applicability of the functionality
doctrine to a trademark that is the subject of an incontestable registration; 159 review of questions of statutory interpretation; 160 review of
the district court's findings of jurisdictional facts;' 6' review of the
district court's dismissal of claims; 162 review of the district court's
decision to exclude expert testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules
of Evidence; 1 3 review of a district court's decision to vacate an arbitra-

147. Frehling Enters. v. International Select Group, 192 F.3d 1330, 1335 (11th Cir.
1999) (clearly erroneous).
148. Id. (clearly erroneous).
149. Waters v. International Precious Metals Corp., 190 F.3d 1291, 1293 (11th Cir.
1999) (abuse of discretion); ACLU of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir. 1999)
(abuse of discretion).
150. Gulf Power Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1328 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo).
151. Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank, N.A., 183 F.3d 1269, 1272 (11th Cir.
1999) (de novo).
152. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 182 F.3d 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 1999)
(substantial evidence in the record considered as a whole).
153. Tefel v. Reno, 180 F.3d 1286, 1295 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo).
154. Rodriguez v. Reno, 178 F.3d 1139, 1144-45 (11th Cir. 1999) (abuse of discretion).
155. Randolph v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 178 F.3d 1149, 1152 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo).
156. Cooper/T. Smith, Inc. v. NLRB, 177 F.3d 1259, 1261 (11th Cir. 1999) (substantial
evidence).
157. Sanders v. Howze, 177 F.3d 1245, 1248 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo).
158. Walter v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 181 F.3d 1198, 1201 (11th Cir.
1999) (abuse of discretion).
159. Pudenz v. Littlefuse, Inc., 177 F.3d 1204, 1207 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo).
160. Kay v. Apfel, 176 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo).
161. Scarfo v. Ginsberg, 175 F.3d 957, 960 (11th Cir. 1999) (clear error).
162. Id. (abuse of discretion).
163. United States v. Paul, 175 F.3d 906, 909 (11th Cir. 1999) (abuse of discretion).
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a damages award under the Federal Tort
the district court's rulings on discovery;'6
the pleadings; 67 and review of the district
of a sovereign's immunity from suit."6

164. IMC-Agrico Co. v. International Chem. Workers Council of the United Food &
Commercial Workers Union, 171 F.3d 1322, 1325 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo).
165. Whitley v. United States, 170 F.3d 1061, 1079 (11th Cir. 1999) (clearly erroneous).
166. Burger King Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1315 (11th Cir. 1999) (abuse of
discretion).
167. Mergens v. Dreyfoos, 166 F.3d 1114, 1116 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo).
168. Florida Paraplegic Ass'n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 F.3d 1126,
1128 (11th Cir. 1999) (de novo).

